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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—A TALE OF TWO SHOOTINGS: SHOULD A
BIVENS REMEDY BE AVAILABLE WHEN CBP AGENTS SHOOT AND KILL
VICTIMS ON THE MEXICAN SIDE OF THE BORDER?

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2012, Jose Antonio Elena Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), a sixteen-yearold Mexican national, died in a hail of gunfire.1 The shooter, a Customs and
Border Patrol (“CBP”) agent, fired southward from the United States’ border fence, several feet above a street in Nogales, Mexico where Rodriguez
fell.2 Not an isolated incident, this shooting came on the heels of another
fatal cross-border shooting of fifteen-year-old Sergio Hernandez at the
hands of a CBP agent in Texas.3
Because the victims died in Mexico, no statutory remedy for the killings existed to compensate the victims’ survivors.4 As such, the victims’
families sued the individual agents under an implied remedy theory coined
in Bivens v. Six Unnamed Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,5 alleging
violations of the victims’ Fourth Amendment rights.6 A Bivens claim affords
“victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent . . . [the] right to
recover damages against the agent in federal court in the absence of statutory authority conferring such a right.”7 The Supreme Court has recognized
the availability of Bivens claims for Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment
violations.8 The Court’s more recent jurisprudence, however, reveals a con1. Kristine Phillips, U.S. Border Agent Who Repeatedly Shot Mexican Teen Through a
Fence Acquitted of Murder, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/2018/04/24/u-s-border-agent-who-repeatedly-shot-mexican-teenthrough-a-fence-acquitted-of-murder/.
2. Id.
3. Hernandez v. Mesa (Hernandez III), 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017).
4. See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 739 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing the Federal
Tort Claims Act’s proscription of suits “arising in a foreign country”), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Sept. 7, 2018) (No. 18-309); Hernandez v. Mesa (Hernandez IV), 885 F.3d 811, 815
(5th Cir. 2018) (stating “[n]o federal statute authorizes a damages action by a foreign citizen
injured on foreign soil by a federal law enforcement officer”), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2636
(U.S. May 28, 2019) (No. 17-1678).
5. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402 n.4
(1971).
6. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 727; Hernandez v. United States (Hernandez I), 757 F.3d
249, 255 (5th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam).
7. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
8. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16–20; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241, 245 (1979);
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
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spicuous reticence to extend Bivens remedies beyond those expressly found
in the Court’s prior cases.9
In 2017, with the extension of Bivens claims already on life support,
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ziglar v. Abbasi sounded what appeared to
be the death knell for the extension of Bivens claims.10 Abbasi presented an
opportunity for the Court to consider the applicability of a Bivens claim to
redress multiple constitutional violations of the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights.11 Abbasi emphasized the role of “special factors counseling hesitation” in the lower courts’ calculus on whether to recognize a
Bivens claim.12 Abbasi served as the backdrop for the conflicting circuit
court decisions that addressed the propriety of a Bivens claim when a federal
agent shoots a foreign national from the American side of the Mexican border.13
Part II of this note addresses the background of Bivens claims and
shifts to an analysis of Abbasi.14 Part III outlines the decisions at the heart of
the circuit split over whether, after Abbasi, a cross-border shooting presents
a cognizable Bivens claim.15 Part IV demonstrates the Fourth Amendment’s
applicability to cross-border shootings.16 Part V argues that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s disposition in Rodriguez v. Swartz
comported with the strictures of Abbasi and that the extension of a Bivens
claim to the victims’ survivors adhered to both the letter and spirit of the
law.17 This note concludes that victims of a cross-border shooting launched
from American soil by federal agents are entitled to proceed under Bivens.18

9. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017).
10. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Decline of the Right to Redress, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 2167, 2175 (2018).
11. Id. at 2169.
12. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859–63.
13. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 737–39 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Sept. 7, 2018) (No. 18-309); Hernandez IV, 885 F.3d 811, 815–16 (5th Cir. 2018), cert.
granted, (U.S. May 28, 2019) (No. 17-1678). At the outset, the implication of qualified immunity on cross-border shootings is beyond the scope of this note, however, in Rodriguez v.
Swartz, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity to
the federal agent. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 732–34.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part VI.
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II. BACKGROUND: THE RIGHT TO REDRESS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY FEDERAL AGENTS
A.

The Right to Recover Damages Against Federal Agents for Constitutional Violations Pre-Bivens

The roots of the right to recover against government agents in their individual capacities for constitutional violations predate the United States.19
In England, as early as 1285, false imprisonment suits were available against
sheriffs who executed felony arrests absent an indictment.20 The American
Revolution and subsequent British ouster significantly curtailed––almost
50%––citizens’ rights to redress against the government; however, “the
great category of suits against [government] officers” developed in the English common law survived.21
Since the founding, an individual’s status as a federal agent has never
conferred a blanket immunity from common law suits.22 But if a federal
agent could show that the conduct giving rise to the suit stemmed from actions taken in the agent’s official capacity, then the agent could plead justification as a defense.23 The scope of the justification defense extended to the
bounds of authorized conduct.24 Because the government cannot authorize
constitutional violations, such violations vitiate the justification defense.25
Without the shroud of governmental authority, government officers were
subject to state law suits on the same footing as ordinary individuals.26 In the
context of Fourth Amendment violations, victims brought suit against federal agents based on the common law theory of trespass.27 Finally, damages
remedies have historically been the ordinary remedy for “an invasion of
personal interests in liberty.”28

19. Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 531 (2013).
20. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1963).
21. Id. at 20.
22. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 19, at 531.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 537.
28. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971).
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B.

The Birth, Extension, and Decline of The Implied Federal Cause of
Action

Whether victims of constitutional violations perpetrated by federal
agents could access the federal courts for redress remained an open question
until 1970 when the Court decided Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.29 Twenty-five years before Bivens, in Bell v.
Hood, the Court addressed the propriety of a lower court’s dismissal, on
jurisdictional grounds, of a complaint in federal court against federal agents
alleging Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations.30 The Court found that
jurisdiction was proper because “the right of the petitioners to recover under
their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United
States are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another.”31 Bell, however, left unanswered whether a right to redress could be
had for constitutional violations. In Bivens, the Court answered the ultimate
question in Bell of whether constitutional violations can support a cognizable claim and ruled in favor of an implied federal cause of action against
federal agents for the violation of the Fourth Amendment. 32 The Court extended Bivens to two additional contexts.33
1.

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents of Bureau of Narcotics

Bivens recognized, for the first time, a federal cause of action for a
Fourth Amendment violation against a federal agent in her individual capacity.34 In 1965, Mr. Bivens claimed that federal agents entered his apartment
and arrested him without a warrant.35 During the arrest, the agents “manacled [Mr. Bivens] in front of his wife and children, and threatened to arrest
the entire family.”36 After restraining Mr. Bivens, the agents searched the
apartment before transporting him to a federal courthouse where he was
interrogated and subjected to a visual strip search.37 The absence of a warrant, combined with the arrest and the use of force employed to secure the
29. Id. at 389.
30. 327 U.S. 678, 679–80, (1946). This note will “use the phrase ‘cause of action’ . . . to
refer roughly to the alleged invasion of ‘recognized legal rights’ upon which a litigant bases
his claim for relief.” Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1979) (quoting Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 693 (1949)).
31. Bell, 327 U.S. at 685.
32. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
33. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854–1855 (2017).
34. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.

2019]

BIVENS ON THE BORDER

175

arrest, served as the bases for Mr. Bivens’s allegations of Fourth Amendment violations.38
In allowing Mr. Bivens’s claims to proceed, the Court rejected the
agents’ contention that the sole remedy available to Mr. Bivens rested on
state tort law.39 The Court found unpersuasive the agents’ argument that
their conduct, if tortious, presented a run-of-the-mill state law claim as if
between two ordinary individuals.40 Instead, the Court noted that an agent’s
unconstitutional action “in the name of the United States possesses a far
greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser.”41 The nature of the
Fourth Amendment vis-à-vis state law also compelled the Court’s ultimate
decision.42 The Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment served as a
limitation on the exercise of federal authority regardless of whether an abuse
of that authority would satisfy the elements of a state law claim.43 The Court
concluded that it “should hardly seem a surprising proposition” that “damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the Fourth
Amendment by federal officials.”44
In its conclusion that damages could be available when the government
violated a citizen’s constitutional rights, the Court alluded to a limiting principle to guide lower courts when deciding whether a cause of action should
extend to other contexts.45 This principle is manifested in Bivens through the
Court’s emphasis on the lack of “special factors counseling hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress.”46 The idea being that if a special
factor counseled hesitation, then the Court should stay its hand in that instance.47 The Court stopped short of a precise definition of the special factors and instead listed examples of special factors that the Court previously
found to deny a federal cause of action.48 These examples included questions
of federal fiscal policy, congressional inaction to create a liability within its
authority, and an attempt to “impose liability upon a congressional employee for actions contrary to no constitutional prohibition.”49

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 390–91.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390–91.
Id. at 392.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 395.
See id. at 396–97.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 396–97.
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Davis v. Passman and Carlson v. Green

The Supreme Court’s first extension of a Bivens claim came in Davis v.
Passman.50 There, Ms. Davis alleged that her superior, then a United States
Representative, discriminated against her on the basis of sex in contravention of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.51 The Court expanded on the “special factors” from
Bivens in its analysis and added another point of emphasis, namely the
availability of other remedies.52 The Court acknowledged that the status of a
congressman raised special factors counseling hesitation based on separation
of powers principles, but resolved that the Speech and Debate Clause’s provision of shelter ensured that the judiciary would not encroach on congressional power.53 If the Speech and Debate Clause did not offer protection to
the former representative, then “the principle that legislators . . . ought generally to be bound by [the law] as are ordinary persons” applied.54 The absence of a congressional proscription of damages remedies for an equal protection violation tilted away from finding a special factor.55 Regarding the
available remedies, the Court focused on the absence of equitable remedies
and concluded that damages served as the only available redress.56 Ultimately, the Court concluded that Ms. Davis’s equal protection claim was cognizable under Bivens.57
In Carlson v. Green, the Supreme Court once again acknowledged the
availability of a Bivens claim when it concluded that a cruel and unusual
punishment allegation brought under the Eighth Amendment gave rise to a
federal cause of action.58 In Green, the administratrix of Mr. Green, a prisoner at the time of his death, filed a Bivens action against the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons.59 The defendants argued a special factor existed because
“requiring them to defend [the] suit might inhibit their efforts to perform
their official duties.”60 The Court pointed to qualified immunity as the safe-

50. See generally Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
51. Id. at 231.
52. Id. at 245–46.
53. Id. at 246.
54. Id. (alteration in original).
55. Id. at 246–47.
56. Davis, 442 U.S. at 245.
57. Id. at 234.
58. 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017)
(acknowledging that Carlson marked the court’s second extension of a Bivens claim on the
allegation that “failure to provide adequate medical treatment” could give rise to a constitutional violation).
59. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16.
60. Id. at 19.
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guard to the defendants’ contention and found no special factor counseling
hesitation.61
The Court also rejected the defendants’ contention that the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), enacted before Bivens, preempted Bivens and created
an “equally effective remedy for constitutional violations.”62 The Court explained that the FTCA, which waived sovereign immunity and allowed for
tort claims to be brought against the United States for the negligence of federal officials, and Bivens claims served different purposes.63 The Court highlighted the heightened deterrence brought about by the imposition of individual liability and found such deterrence warranted the availability of
Bivens in addition to claims brought under the FTCA. At bottom, the Court
found that the existence of another remedy does not necessarily bar a Bivens
claim.64
C.

Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Supreme Court’s Reluctance to Extend Bivens

After Green, the Supreme Court displayed a reluctance to extend
Bivens.65 Eight cases reached the Supreme Court asserting the right to recover against federal agents for varied constitutional violations; each case
failed to persuade the Court that Bivens applied.66 As explained in Abbasi,
the Court’s subsequent Bivens cases revealed a seismic shift in the Court’s
understanding of its role vis-à-vis Congress in extending liability to federal
officials.67 Tellingly, the majority in Abbasi expressed that the Court’s mod-

61. Id.
62. Id. at 19–20 (finding that the FTCA as amended in 1974 to include intentional
torts committed by federal agents did not make the FTCA the exclusive remedy for such
torts, and, instead, that the legislative record combined with Congress’s usual course of making it clear when the FTCA offered an exclusive remedy resulted in the conclusion that the
FTCA and Bivens were complementary).
63. Id. at 20–21.
64. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21.
65. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). In Abbasi, the Court rehearsed its
prior decisions to deny an extension of Bivens:
[T]he Court declined to create an implied damages remedy in the following cases: a First
Amendment suit against a federal employer, a race-discrimination suit against military officers, a substantive due process suit against military officers, a procedural due process suit
against Social Security officials, a procedural due process suit against a federal agency for
wrongful termination, an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison operator, a due
process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management, and an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at a private prison.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority that garnered
four out of the six justices’ assent as Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch took no part in
the decision.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1856.

178

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

ern stance on Bivens remedies would likely not have allowed the decision in
Bivens in the first place.68
The Abbasi plaintiffs asserted multiple claims against two discrete
groups of federal officials.69 The first group, dubbed the “Executive Officials,” comprised the United States Attorney General, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Naturalization Service
Commissioner.70 The second group, the “Wardens,” oversaw the detention
facility where the claims arose.71
The Abbasi plaintiffs sought damages based on allegations of multiple
constitutional violations stemming from their confinement in federal custody.72 The plaintiffs’ confinement occurred in the wake of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks.73 After the attacks, tips pointing to potential terrorists
deluged the FBI and resulted in the arrest and detention of 700 individuals,
including the plaintiffs, on immigration charges.74 The FBI classified the
detainees as either “of interest” or “not of interest.”75 If a detainee’s status
could not be resolved, the detainee received the same classification as those
“of interest” and was detained “subject to a hold-until-cleared policy” without bail.76 The plaintiffs fell in the “of interest” category.77 They alleged
conditions of confinement that constituted violations of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.78 An overarching claim alleged that “Executive Officials”
confined the plaintiffs because of their “race, religion, or national origin, in
violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.”79 The
plaintiffs further claimed that the Bureau of Prisons’ policy requiring internment for twenty-three hours a day in “tiny” cells violated their constitutional rights.80 So too did the alleged deprivation of recreation time and a
denial of access to basic hygiene products.81 Finally, they claimed that the
guards subjected them to a pattern of physical and verbal abuse in addition
to random strip searches.82
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1853.
70. Id.
71. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1853 (reaching the Court on a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and the Court assumed the facts alleged as true for the purposes of the case); see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
72. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct at 1851–52.
73. Id. at 1852.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1852–53.
78. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1853–54.
79. Id. at 1853–54.
80. Id. at 1853.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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On its way to declining a Bivens remedy, the Court first explained the
judicial proclivity to imply damages remedies in statutes at the time of
Bivens,83 referring to the “ancien regime” under which Bivens arose as a
time when the “Court assumed it to be a proper judicial function to ‘provide
such remedies as are necessary to make effective’ a statute’s purpose.”84
Abbasi noted the decline of the Court’s extension of implied causes of action and the rise of the Court’s insistence on its role as “limited solely to
determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action
asserted.”85 If Congress failed to convey its intent to create a private cause of
action in no uncertain terms, then the Court was powerless to imply a cause
of action regardless of its desirability.86 The separation of powers principles
that undergirded the Court’s recent jurisprudence on statutory implied causes of action laid the framework for the Court’s denial of a Bivens claim in
Abbasi.87
“When a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under the
Constitution itself, . . . separation of powers principles are or should be central to the analysis.”88 The Court reduced the calculus of the separation of
powers analysis to the question of whether Congress or the courts should
provide a damages remedy, declaring that the answer is most often “those
who write the laws.”89 Deference to the separation of powers necessarily
implicates the “special factors counseling hesitation” aspect of a Bivens
analysis.90
In Abbasi, the Court honed its guidance on the “special factors counseling hesitation.”91 The Court stated that the “inquiry must concentrate on
whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits,” and admonished that
hesitation on the part of the trial court to answer yes to this inquiry presents
a factor foreclosing the extension of Bivens.92 The Court pointed to multiple
considerations in the “special factors” analysis.
The impact of a damages remedy on governmental operations serves as
a fundamental consideration of whether a “special factor” counsels hesitation.93 Also, Congress’s decision to exercise “its regulatory authority in a
83. Id. at 1854.
84. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1855 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287
(2001); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)).
85. Id. (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)).
86. Id. at 1855–56.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1857.
89. Id.
90. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1857–58.
93. Id.
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guarded way” served as another example of an instance where congressional
intent pointed away from judicial interference.94 The Court also deemed the
congressional provision of alternative remedies as another factor compelling
the denial of a Bivens extension.95
The multiple considerations capable of giving rise to “special factors”
leads to the conclusion that the Court sought to greatly curtail the already
anemic Bivens action. Beyond the “special factors” analysis, the Court emphasized caution in the extension of Bivens to a new context as such an extension is a “disfavored judicial activity.”96 The Court posited that a new
Bivens context arises when a different constitutional right is implicated or if
the same constitutional right is implicated and there exists the potential that
“special factors” were not considered in an earlier case.97 “If the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by [the]
Court, then the context is new.”98 The Court elaborated on this test by pointing out that the constitutional violation and the means of the violation in
Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko99 mirrored the government
officials’ conduct in Carlson v. Green.100 In Malesko, however, the Court
rejected the Bivens claim based on its “special factors” analysis, an unnecessary analysis had the Court concluded that Malesko did not present a new
Bivens context.101 Abbasi concluded that the detention policy claims against
the “Executive Officials” presented a new Bivens context.102
A finding that the context was new necessitated a “special factors”
analysis in which the Court concluded that Congress—not the Court—
should decide whether a damage remedy should exist.103 The Court based its
reasoning on the attendant intricacies inherent in the development and implementation of the detention policy at the national level.104 The Court further noted that discovery would intrude on the “discussion and deliberations
that led to the formulation of the policy.”105 The Court relied on precedent to
note that this intrusion could chill the “free flow of advice” upon which the
other branches rely to develop and implement policy.106 Another factor of
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 665 (2009)).
97. Id. at 1864.
98. Id. at 1859.
99. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
100. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859 (comparing Malesko 534 U.S. at 67–68 and Carlson v.
Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980)).
101. Malesko, 534 U.S at 66.
102. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
103. Id. at 1859–60.
104. Id. at 1861.
105. Id. at 1860–61.
106. Id. at 1861 (quoting Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 360 (1979)).
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central importance to the Court’s conclusion was the availability of other
remedies such as an injunction or possibly a writ of habeas corpus.107 Finally, the Court distinguished the detention policy at issue from ordinary law
enforcement practices through its emphasis on the impetus for the policy,
namely the terrorist attacks.108 The Court insisted that Congress and the
President control national security policy and thus, judicial intervention in
this milieu raises the alarm of judicial encroachment.109 These reasons combined with congressional silence on a matter wholly known to Congress led
the Court to conclude that the “special factors” commanded a decision that
Bivens did not apply to the detention policies.110
III. THE APPLICATION OF ZIGLAR V. ABBASI TO CROSS-BORDER SHOOTINGS
SPLITS THE NINTH AND FIFTH CIRCUITS
A.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Denies a
Bivens Extension to the Survivors of a Cross-Border Shooting Victim

On June 7, 2010, fifteen-year-old Sergio Hernandez’s (“Hernandez”)
life ended when CBP agent Jesus Mesa (“Mesa”) fired a bullet across the
border.111 The complaint before the Supreme Court alleged that Hernandez
and his friends were playing a game in which they would run from the Mexican side across a concrete culvert separating the United States and Mexico
and touch the border fence.112 During the game, Mesa arrived on bicycle and
detained one of Hernandez’s friends.113 After subduing the friend, Mesa
trained his weapon on Hernandez, who was then crouched behind a concrete
support beam underneath a rail bridge that connected El Paso, Texas with
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.114 Mesa then fired two shots from the United States’
side of the border, one of which struck and killed Hernandez while he was
on Mexican soil.115 After the shooting, Hernandez’s survivors brought an
107. Id. at 1862–63.
108. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63.
109. Id. at 1861.
110. Id. at 1860–61.
111. Hernandez III, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017). For this case, the Court assumed the
facts alleged as true because the case was dismissed on Federal Rules Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) motions. The Justice Department concluded that the shooting occurred “while
smugglers attempting an illegal border crossing hurled rocks from close range at a Border
Patrol agent.” Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. A cell phone captured grainy video of the shooting. CBS News, Mexico Teen
Shot on Tape, YOUTUBE (June 10, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DCh9sMkVPU.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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action against Mesa under Bivens alleging violations of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.116
In Hernandez v. United States (“Hernandez II”), the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, issued its second of what would ultimately be three opinions
addressing the Bivens claims at issue.117 Hernandez v. United States (“Hernandez I”) held that Hernandez’s status as a Mexican national with no voluntary ties to the United States failed the “sufficient connections test” announced in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez118 and thus, the Fourth
Amendment did not extend extraterritorially to protect Hernandez.119 Because the sine qua non of a Bivens claim is a constitutional violation, and the
absence of a constitutional right forecloses the possibility of a constitutional
violation, the court rejected Hernandez’s Fourth Amendment claim. 120 Hernandez II affirmed this ruling on the same grounds.121 The Supreme Court
took up Hernandez’s case and decided it one week after Abbasi.122
In Hernandez v. Mesa (“Hernandez III”), the Supreme Court vacated
the opinion below and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of
Abbasi.123 The Court issued guidance to the lower court and emphasized the
“special factors” analysis expounded upon in Abbasi.124 The Court then expressed approval of the lower court’s decision to conduct the constitutional
116. Hernandez I, 757 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 785 F.3d 117 (5th
Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam). In
addition to Mesa, Hernandez originally sued the United States under the FTCA and the Alien
Tort Statute.
117. See id.; Hernandez v. United States (Hernandez II), 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015) (en
banc), vacated sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam); Hernandez
IV, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, (U.S. May 28, 2019) (No. 17-1678).
118. 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (explaining “the people” in the Fourth Amendment “refers
to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community”).
119. Hernandez I, 757 F.3d at 266.
120. Id.; The Hernandez I court did find Hernandez’s Fifth Amendment substantive due
process violation claim cognizable and allowed a Bivens claim to proceed under that theory,
and denied Mesa’s qualified immunity defense. Id. at 267–77; Hernandez II reversed the
panel’s holding that qualified immunity did not apply and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all claims. Hernandez II, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), vacated sub nom.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam); Because the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham v. Connor rejects the application of a Fifth Amendment due process analysis
for an excessive force claim, this note elides the Fifth Amendment claims raised by Hernandez. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (stating that “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment”) (internal quotations omitted).
121. Hernandez II, 785 F.3d at 119.
122. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Hernandez III, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).
123. Hernandez III, 137 S. Ct. at 2006–08.
124. Id. at 2006.
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analysis of the Fourth Amendment’s applicability while assuming the availability of a Bivens claim as this tact would likely dispose of the case without
reaching the Bivens question.125 The Court, however, declined to rule on the
Fourth Amendment question because it “[was] sensitive and [could] have
consequences that are far reaching.”126 The Court concluded with an admonishment that the guidance from Abbasi may enable a lower court to evade
the Fourth Amendment question.127
In Hernandez v. Mesa (“Hernandez IV”) the en banc Fifth Circuit applied Abbasi and concluded that the extraterritoriality questions presented by
the case in conjunction with multiple “special factors” compelled the denial
of a Bivens action to Hernandez.128 The court hewed to the Abbasi two-part
inquiry to determine whether a Bivens remedy is available.129 The court first
reasoned that the open question of the Fourth Amendment’s reach into Mexican soil to protect a Mexican citizen provided ample reason to conclude
that this case presented a new Bivens context.130 The court elaborated by
pointing out the Supreme Court’s lack of “judicial guidance concerning the
extraterritorial scope of the Constitution.”131 It further added that United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez can be read to preclude such an extraterritorial
extension of the Fourth Amendment.132 The court concluded this prong of
the analysis with the belief that the new context of the asserted Bivens claim
directed a denial of a Bivens action on its own, but nevertheless proceeded
to the “special factors” analysis.133
The thrust of Hernandez IV’s “special factors” analysis focused on national security implications.134 The court highlighted that “[t]he Supreme
Court has never implied a Bivens remedy in a case involving the military,
national security, or intelligence.”135 The court added that Congress tasked
the Border Patrol with the deterrence of illegal entry, terrorists, and weapons
at the border.136 The court further hesitated to imply a damages remedy due
to the deleterious effect such liability might have on an agent’s response to
threats that often require split-second countermeasures.137 Beyond the con125. Id. at 2007.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Hernandez IV, 885 F.3d at 816–23.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 817.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 818.
134. Id.
135. Hernandez IV, 885 F.3d 811, 818–19 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, (U.S. May 28,
2019) (No. 17-1678) (quoting Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
136. Id. at 819.
137. Id.
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cerns for agent safety and national security, the court pointed to diplomatic
concerns that presented further cause for hesitation in extending Bivens.138
The Fifth Circuit decided that the extension of Bivens risked judicial
overreach into sensitive matters of foreign policy.139 To buttress its decision,
the court pointed to the Mexican government’s desire for a damages remedy
as a substitute for the executive branch’s refusal to extradite Mesa to face
charges for the shooting as evidence of the sensitive foreign relations implications.140 Concern for the executive branch’s standing in the diplomatic
arena, in the court’s estimation, created greater pause to extend the remedy
because “[i]t would undermine Mexico’s respect for the validity of the Executive’s prior determinations.”141 In hewing to Abbasi, the court next
looked to whether Congress intended to create a remedy in this situation.142
The court attributed intention to Congress’s silence on the availability
of a remedy in the border context.143 The increased national security policy
focused on the Mexican border informed the court’s reluctance to “believe
that congressional inaction was inadvertent.”144 To show that congressional
silence revealed that Congress intentionally elided a remedy, the court highlighted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constrained damages remedies to claimants
within the jurisdiction of the United States.145 The court looked next to the
FTCA, which excluded “any claim arising in a foreign country” as further
evidence that the absence of a remedy in the cross-border context was not
the product of a congressional oversight.146
Next, the court rejected the argument that the absence of a federal remedy compelled a Bivens claim on the grounds that Bivens served as the only
deterrence to unconstitutional federal conduct.147 It acknowledged that the
presence of an alternative remedy was dispositive to foreclosing a Bivens
remedy, but stated that the absence of a remedy alone does not give rise to
an implied one when the case presents “special factors.”148 The court also
pointed out the deterrence already in place to ensure federal agents operate
within the confines of the law, acknowledging that “the DOJ is currently
prosecuting another Border Patrol agent in Arizona for the cross-border
homicide of a Mexican citizen.”149 The deterrence analysis ended with a
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 819–20.
Id. at 820.
Hernandez IV, 885 F.3d at 820.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017)).
Id.
Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2019).
Hernandez IV, 885 F.3d at 821.
Id.
Id.
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separation of powers argument, stating that alternative remedies notwithstanding, when “a balance is to be struck” between deterrence and national
security, Congress should strike the balance.150
B.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Allows a
Bivens Action to Proceed Against a Border Patrol Agent

In the waning minutes of October 10, 2012, Border Patrol agent Lonnie
Swartz (“Swartz”) responded to alleged rock throwers beyond the United
States’ border with lethal force, killing Elena Rodriguez. 151 When Swartz
fired the fatal shots, he stood behind the border fence on an embankment
twenty-five feet above the street in Nogales, Mexico, where Rodriguez was
walking at the time of the homicide.152 A local newspaper in Tucson, Arizona summarized the expert testimony of a forensic pathologist and reported
that:
While Swartz’s first shot was catastrophic, Elena Rodriguez was still
alive until the final shot, which sliced through the helix of his right ear
and punch[ed] through the skull, lacerat[ed] his mid-brain, before [it
came] to rest just beneath his scalp.153

Ten bullets pierced the sixteen-year-old’s body.154 As a result, Rodriguez’s survivors sued Swartz in his individual capacity for Fourth and Fifth
Amendment violations under Bivens.155
The Ninth Circuit held that the survivors could proceed under
Bivens.156 The court confronted the Fourth Amendment question and ruled
that Rodriguez “had a Fourth Amendment right to be free from the objec150. Id. (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1863 (2017)).
151. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.
Sept. 7, 2018) (No. 18-309). The court reviewed this case on interlocutory appeal regarding
whether agent Swartz was entitled to qualified immunity. As such, the facts presented were
deemed true for the purposes of appeal. Because this note focuses on the availability of
Bivens in the context of Fourth Amendment excessive force violations in cross–border shootings, I will proceed under the same presumed facts. Also, the United States intervened on
appeal and presented the argument that a Bivens remedy was unavailable. Although Swartz
conceded that Bivens was available in his opening brief, Swartz subsequently incorporated
the government’s argument in his reply brief and the court passed on both qualified immunity
and the availability of Bivens. Id. at 728.
152. Id.
153. Paul Ingram, Swartz Trial: Boy Mortally Wounded But Alive When BP Agent Shot
Him in Head, Says Expert, TUCSON SENTINEL (Nov. 5, 2018), http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/
local/report/110518_swartz_trial/swartz-trial-boy-mortally-wounded-but-alive-when-bpagent-shot-him-head-says-expert/.
154. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 727.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 730.
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tively unreasonable use of deadly force.”157 To reach this conclusion, the
court rejected Swartz’s reliance on United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez and
distinguished it on multiple grounds, the most significant being that Verdugo-Urquidez did not address the conduct of federal agents on American
soil.158 It followed from this distinction that the issues implicated by Mexican sovereignty in Verdugo-Urquidez were absent in Rodriguez’s case.159
Another aspect of the Supreme Court’s reasoning the Ninth Circuit used to
distinguish Verdugo-Urquidez was the fact that Verdugo-Urquidez addressed inefficacy of warrants issued in the United States to operate beyond
United States sovereign territory.160 Because the court believed VerdugoUrquidez to be inapposite, it turned to Boumediene v. Bush161 for authority.162
The Ninth Circuit asserted Boumediene stood for the proposition that
the determination of the Constitution’s reach requires a three-part analysis.163 This analysis revolved around Rodriguez’s “citizenship and status, the
location where the shooting occurred, and any practical concerns that
ar[os]e.”164 The court added that “[n]either citizenship nor voluntary submission to American law is a prerequisite for constitutional rights,” and serve
only as non-dispositive factors to the determination of whether the Constitution applies.165 The court acknowledged that Boumediene extended constitutional protections to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba in part because the United States had complete, practical control over the area.166
Mexico’s sovereignty and practical control over the street where Rodriguez
died notwithstanding, the court concluded that the Fourth Amendment applied.167 After determining that Fourth Amendment protection inured to Rodriguez, the court trained its eye on the Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision in
Hernandez IV.168
After acknowledging that its decision resulted in a circuit split, the
court explained why it diverged from the Fifth Circuit on analogous facts.169
The court rehearsed its above-mentioned argument against applying Verdugo-Urquidez and stated that this case did not involve the practical concerns
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 728.
Id. at 731.
Id.
Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 731.
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 729–30.
Id. at 729.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 730.
Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 731.
Id.
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highlighted first in Verdugo-Urquidez and echoed in Hernandez IV.170 Instead, the only practical effect of an extension of the Fourth Amendment in
these limited circumstances is to “simply say American officers must not
shoot innocent, non-threatening people for no reason.”171 Having dispatched
with the Fourth Amendment question, the court then engaged in a Bivens
analysis through the Abbasi lens.172
The court made short work of finding that this case presented a new
Bivens context, and thus moved to determine whether the plaintiffs had remedies aside from Bivens available.173 The court noted that unwaived sovereign immunity acts as a complete bar to suit on respondeat superior claims
against the United States.174 The court further noted that the limited waiver
granted in the FTCA still precluded “all claims based on any injury suffered
in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred.”175 As a result, the court found that the United States could not be
sued, but refused to cede that Congress’s exclusion of foreign claims in the
FTCA manifested a congressional intention to bar Bivens claims as well.176
The court supported its assertion that Congress did not intend to eliminate Bivens claims through the analysis of an amendment to the FTCA, the
Westfall Act.177 The court viewed the Westfall Act as indicative of Congress’s intent to protect federal agents subject to suit under common law tort
claims while engaged within the scope of employment by mandating that
claims against the individual be brought against the United States. 178 The
court noted, however, that the Westfall Act provides no protection for federal agents’ conduct that violates the Constitution. In the court’s reasoning, the
limitation on protection for constitutional violations proves that Congress
intended for there to be an “explicit exception for Bivens claims.”179 Finally,
the court rejected Swartz’s contention that Rodriguez could bring suit in
state court on the grounds that the Westfall Act precluded such an action.180
The court concluded by saying, “for Rodriguez, it is damages under Bivens
or nothing, and Congress did not intend to preclude Bivens.”181

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 737–48.
173. Id. at 738–44.
174. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 739.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 740.
178. Id.
179. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 807
(2010)).
180. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 741.
181. Id. at 744.
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The Ninth Circuit found “[n]o ‘special factors’ present in this case.”182
The court invoked Abbasi to demonstrate that the “special factors” analysis
is conducted not in the abstract, but to a high degree of specificity.183 It noted that Abbasi microscopically probed the specifics of the detention policy
claims in the context of the September 11, 2001 attacks and not at detention
claims in general.184 The court limited its finding to the specific facts of the
claim, to wit, the cross-border shooting of an unarmed and nonthreatening
individual and not cross-border shootings in general.185 With this qualification announced, the court considered the arenas of national policy and national security.
Contrary to the attacks launched in Abbasi against the high-level detention policies, the court found that Rodriguez was not challenging any policies.186 Indeed, “neither the United States nor Swartz argues that he followed
government policy.”187 Additionally, unlike the Executive Officials sued in
Abbasi, Swartz occupied a “rank-and-file” position that did not implicate the
same concerns noted in Abbasi.188
As with domestic policy, the court found no indication that the extension of Bivens would entangle the court in a separation of powers struggle
that an extension in Abbasi portended.189 Instead, the court recognized the
language in Abbasi warning “that national security concerns must not become a talisman used to ward off inconvenient claims––a label used to cover a multitude of sins.”190 The court concluded that Swartz’s and the United
States’ invocation of national security fit the bill of just such a “talisman.”191
The United States fared no better with the court in its assertion of “special
factors” raised in the foreign policy context.192
Finally, the Ninth Circuit panel addressed the presumption against extraterritoriality.193 The court accepted that the presumption against the extraterritoriality effect of statutes finds an analog in the constitutional context as
well.194 The court stated, however, that the presumption is rebuttable upon a
showing that “actions touch and concern the territory of the United
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 745.
185. Id. at 744.
186. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 745.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 746.
190. Id. at 745 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
191. Id. at 746.
192. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 746–47.
193. Id. at 747.
194. Id.
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States.”195 The court recounted that Swartz launched his barrage of gunfire
from United States soil, an action that gave rise to a “compelling interest”
for the court in terms of regulating “our own government agents’ conduct on
our own soil.”196 Also, the Government’s decision to apply the criminal law
extraterritorially to prosecute Swartz in a federal court provided the court
with additional authority to support its contention that the presumption
against extraterritorial remedies was rebutted.197
In summation, the Ninth Circuit held that the new Bivens context asserted by Rodriguez constituted an available theory of recovery.198
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEIZURES WITHIN THE BORDER AREA SUBJECT TO UNITED STATES’
CONTROL
Whether the Fourth Amendment operates to protect Mexican nationals
from cross-border shootings perpetrated by federal agents from within United States territory remains an open question.199 The federal agents at the root
of the circuit split, based on the facts before the respective courts, employed
objectively unreasonable force in contravention of the Fourth Amendment.200 Thus, the question of extraterritoriality in the context of the United
States border represents the central question of the Fourth Amendment’s
application in cross-border shootings. Given the implications of an extension of the Fourth Amendment to this context, it is understandable that the
Fifth Circuit declined to do so. Cross-border shootings, however, present a
minimal extension of the Fourth Amendment in contrast with the respect for
the Constitution that an extension embodies. The Ninth Circuit’s application
of the Fourth Amendment was therefore proper in the normative sense as
well as in line with Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The Fourth Amendment’s reach across the United States border in the
context of illegal seizures remains an open question.201 While authority ex195. Id. (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Id.
197. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 746.
198. Id. at 748.
199. See Hernandez III, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017) (condoning the Fifth Circuit’s
decision to avoid the Fourth Amendment question due to its sensitivity and potential for far
reaching consequences).
200. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1985) (explaining that the test for unreasonable use of force requires a totality of the circumstances inquiry that includes the severity
of the crime at issue, the threat, if any, the suspect poses to the officers or others, and “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”).
201. See Hernandez III, 137 S. Ct. at 2007 (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s applicability to a cross-border shooting is a sensitive issue that need not be resolved at that time).
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ists that suggests a bright line blocking the Fourth Amendment’s protection
of aliens across the border, it does not foreclose a contrary finding.202 Crucial distinctions between the previous cases and the cross-border context
exist in both the constitutional violation alleged and the location of the government actor at the time the violation occurred. Because the Border Patrol
agents employed deadly force––launched from United States soil––to effectuate unreasonable seizures, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez203 does not
control the extraterritoriality question in the cross-border shooting context.
The Supreme Court’s deepest dive into the Fourth Amendment’s extraterritorial reach came in Verdugo-Urquidez.204 This case arose after Mexican
police delivered Verdugo-Urquidez (“Urquidez”), a suspected drug cartel
leader and Mexican national, to United States marshals in the United
States.205 After his arrest, federal agents acting in concert with Mexican officials, searched various residences of Urquidez in Mexico and seized evidence of his criminal enterprise.206 Initially, the district court granted Urquidez’s suppression motion that argued that the officers’ warrantless search
without further justification violated the Fourth Amendment.207 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme
Court reversed based on its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to the “search and seizure by United States agents of property that is
owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.”208
The Supreme Court gave multiple reasons that led to its finding that the
Fourth Amendment did not protect Urquidez.209 First, the Court set forth a
textual argument that “the people” as utilized in the Fourth Amendment
referred to “a class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have . . . sufficient connection with this country.”210 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist elaborated that neither the Framers nor their contemporaries displayed concern for the rights of nonresident aliens and that the
courts have remained faithful to that lack of concern by refusing to extend

202. Compare United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) (stating that
the contemporaries of the Framers did not understand the Fourth Amendment to apply to
“activities of the United States directed against aliens in foreign territory”), with Boumediene
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that the Constitution granted writs of habeas
corpus to alien detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).
203. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 262.
206. Id. at 262–63.
207. Id. at 263.
208. Id. at 259.
209. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264–68.
210. Id. at 265.
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commensurate rights to aliens.211 Next, Justice Rehnquist pivoted to the
question of where the Fourth Amendment applied and concluded that the
Fourth Amendment, like the Fifth Amendment, is cabined to the sovereign
territory of the United States.212 Finally, while noting that a warrant issued
by a United States magistrate “would be a dead letter” outside of the United
States, the Court warned of the inherent difficulties that an extraterritorial
application of the Fourth Amendment would create for the executive and
legislative branches.213 Having found that Urquidez lacked sufficient ties to
the United States in combination with the location of the searches and seizures occurring in Mexico, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment provided no shelter to Urquidez.214
Justice Brennan’s dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, rejected the majority’s narrow reading of the Constitution’s reach and instead reasoned that
the Constitution’s protections should extend to “wherever the United States
wields power.”215 Justice Brennan posited that the majority’s anachronistic
view failed to account for the proliferation of United States laws that could
be enforced to punish conduct exercised wholly beyond United States territory.216 Instead, he presented a rule that would respect the mutuality of obligations.217 Succinctly put, when the United States expects foreign nationals
in foreign countries to abide by United States laws, the least the United
States can do is to follow the Constitution––the source of the power to enact
and enforce laws––in its enforcement of the law.218 In conclusion, Justice
Brennan invoked Justice Brandeis’s words from Olmstead v. United States
where Brandeis warned:
If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the

211. Eric Bentley, Jr., Toward an International Fourth Amendment: Rethinking Searches
and Seizures Abroad After Verdugo–Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 329, 341 (1994).
212. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269–70.
213. Id. at 274.
214. Id. at 274–75.
215. Bentley, supra note 212, at 340.
216. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279–80 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
pointed to antitrust, securities, “and a host of other federal criminal statutes” that could be
violated without the violator ever stepping foot in the United States based on the effects that
such conduct has on the United States. Id.
217. Id. at 283–84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218. Bentley, supra note 212, at 343; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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means . . . would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine, this Court should resolutely set its face. 219

The Constitution’s extraterritorial reach regarding foreign nationals
remained ensconced in the holding of Verdugo-Urquidez until the Court
took up Boumediene v. Bush in 2007.220
In Boumediene, the Court confronted the question of “whether foreign
nationals apprehended and detained in [Guantanamo Bay] during a time of
serious threats to our Nation’s security, may assert the privilege of the writ
[of habeas corpus] . . . .”221 The Court rebuffed the approach taken in Verdugo-Urquidez, acknowledging that “questions of extraterritoriality turn on
objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism,” and concluded that
the detainees were entitled to the writ.222 The Court noted that the Constitution’s force does not categorically stop “where de jure sovereignty ends.”223
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy recognized that the United States
retained actual control over Guantanamo Bay through calculated negotiations and that the Government could not rely on technicalities to empower it
to “switch the Constitution on or off at will.”224 Instead of a categorical bar
to the Constitution’s extraterritorial reach, the Court set out a three-factor
test.225 The factors considered:
(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which the status determination was made; (2) the nature of
the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the
writ.226

The Court’s analysis of the first factor homed in on the adequacy of the
process Congress afforded to the detainees: the Court found the substitutes
for habeas petitions inadequate.227 Moving to the second factor, the Court
decided that in all practicality, the United States exercised full dominion
over Guantanamo Bay.228 Finally, the Court ruled that the United States’
control over Guantanamo Bay removed the obstacles found in prior cases
219. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 285 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
220. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
221. Id. at 746; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
222. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764.
223. Id. at 755, 764–65.
224. Id. at 765–66.
225. Id. at 766.
226. Id.
227. Tung Yin, Boumediene and Lawfare, 43 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 865, 875 (2009)
(citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 791).
228. Id.
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declining the extension of the Constitution extraterritorially as impractical.229 The Court concluded that Congress’s only option to remove the privilege of habeas corpus was through an invocation of the Suspension
Clause.230 At bottom, Boumediene broke from the plurality’s formalistic
approach in Verdugo-Urquidez that relied on single dispositive factors such
as citizenship and location, forging a path forward that employed a “functional approach” that considered practical considerations to determine the
extraterritorial applicability of constitutional protections.231
The Ninth Circuit adhered to the functional approach and analyzed the
Boumediene factors to create a framework applicable to the cross-border
shooting context that this note adopts for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment extraterritoriality analysis.232 Following that framework, the
first factor concerned the citizenship and status of the individual fighting for
constitutional protection.233 In both shootings, the victims’ citizenship and
statuses were unknown to the Border Patrol agents prior to their opening
fire.234 It is arbitrary to draw the Fourth Amendment protection line solely
based on citizenship and not in keeping with the holding in Boumediene
where the Supreme Court granted constitutional protection to noncitizens.
The counterargument to the above contention in the cross-border shooting
context would confer Fourth Amendment protection upon a United States
citizen should she find herself on the wrong side of a Border Patrol agent’s
bullet while standing on Mexican soil within sight of the United States border. The Constitution cannot rise or fall based on such a trivial distinction
when lives are at stake. It is likely that if the roles were reversed and a Mexican agent shot from Mexico and killed an innocent United States citizen on
United States’ soil, then the full force of the United States government
would rain down on that agent ; the United States’ conspicuous position of
power would yield results that the Mexican government could not attain for

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82
U. S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 261 (2009); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 762 (2008)
(rejecting the government’s argument that a prior case held the extension of constitutional
protections turned on a formalistic approach and instead positing that the prior case highlighted the importance of practical considerations).
232. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 729 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.
Sept. 7, 2018) (No. 18-309); see also Hernandez II, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc),
vacated sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam) (applying the
Boumediene factors to the extraterritoriality of the Fifth Amendment).
233. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 729.
234. See id. at 733; Hernandez III, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017) (stating that Hernandez’s
nationality was unknown to the Agent at the time of the shooting).
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its slain citizens.235 Thus, the citizenship and status of a person seized on
Mexican soil through conduct launched from United States’ soil should not
weigh heavily against the application of the Fourth Amendment extraterritorially in the cross-border context.
The next factor derived from Boumediene concerns the location of the
alleged constitutional violation.236 The United States’ de facto sovereignty
over Guantanamo Bay did play an important role in the decision to extend
the writ of habeas corpus to the detainees held there.237 But Boumediene did
not rest solely on this distinction, and the language from Boumediene contemplates flexibility in this factor.238 Mexico’s sovereignty over the territory
south of the border does not necessarily defeat the extension of constitutional protections.239 The United States has long exerted power over the border
region, and therefore it is not irrational to expect the United States to abide
by constitutional norms in this area.240 Tellingly, in 2011, the Chief of the
United States Border Patrol explained that “border security policy ‘extends
[the nation’s] zone of security outward, ensuring’” that the physical border
is not the last line of defense.241 Such policies expand United States control
to the cross-border region and further militate in favor of a finding that the
Fourth Amendment applies there.
A further distinction that conforms with Boumediene and departs from
Verdugo-Urquidez arises from the proximity of the agents’ conduct to United States soil. It cannot be over-emphasized that the federal agents acted
with their boots firmly planted in the United States.242 Practical considerations that carried the day in Boumediene compel a finding that the propinquity of the seizure to the United States coupled with the location of the
federal agents should weigh the location factor in favor of an extension of
the Fourth Amendment. The government’s conduct in Verdugo-Urquidez
occurred solely in Mexico and represented an intrusion in property interests
235. See Hernandez IV, 885 F.3d 811, 820 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, (U.S. May 28,
2019) (No. 17-1678) (noting the United States’ refusal to Mexico’s request to extradite agent
Mesa).
236. Rodriguez, 799 F.3d at 729.
237. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
238. Eva L. Bitran, Note, Boumediene at the Border? The Constitution and Foreign
Nationals on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 229, 239 (2014).
239. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754 (stating that sovereignty alone does not end an extraterritorial analysis).
240. Bitran, supra note 239, at 248.
241. Hernandez I, 757 F.3d 249, 270 (5th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 785 F.3d 117 (5th
Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam).
242. See Hernandez III, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2004 (2017) (remarking that the complaint alleged that the agent shot Hernandez from American soil); Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719,
727 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 7, 2018) (No. 18-309) (pointing to the
complaint’s allegations that the agent shot from the border fence while on American soil).
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and implicated warrant considerations not present in the cross-border context.243 The agents in the cross-border shootings acted from within the United States, and intruded on the liberty of the victims to live.244 Thus, the functional approach rejects any reliance on an invisible line as the barrier to constitutional protections designed to constrain the federal government.
The final factor derived from Boumediene weighs the “practical obstacles inherent in enforcing” the Fourth Amendment in a cross-border context.245 The rule this note advocates only covers the extension of the Fourth
Amendment to unreasonable seizures effected through the use of deadly
force and leaves untouched other Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in relation to the border. With that in mind, there is little distinction to be made
between a cross-border setting and the streets of Memphis, Tennessee in the
deadly force analysis.246 There is no practical obstacle to the enforcement of
the simple admonition from Tennessee v. Garner that “a police officer may
not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”247 Every law enforcement officer in the United States is bound by the deadly force
rule set forth in Garner and, thus, the expectation that Border Patrol agents
will so comply imposes no additional burden.
Opponents to a proposed rule that extends Fourth Amendment protections to noncitizens shot by United States agents from United States soil
would likely cabin Boumediene to the specific constitutional question at
issue and hold out Verdugo-Urquidez as the authority on the Fourth
Amendment’s extraterritorial reach.248 Such an approach dismisses the functional analysis Justice Kennedy employed in Boumediene to determine the
Constitution’s extraterritorial reach.249 Also, Verdugo-Urquidez raised an
argument based on the Warrant Clause.250 Both the majority opinion and
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence acknowledged the inefficacy of a warrant
issued by a United States magistrate to search and seize property in a foreign
land.251 There is even an argument to be made that though Justice Kennedy
243. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that adherence to the warrant requirement would be “impracticable and
anomalous”).
244. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008).
245. Hernandez II, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), vacated sub nom. Hernandez
v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam).
246. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
247. Id. at 11.
248. See Hernandez IV, 885 F.3d 811, 817 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, (U.S. May 28,
2019) (No. 17-1678) (noting that since the holding in Boumediene, federal circuit courts have
rejected any extension to Boumediene where the United States had neither de jure or de facto
control).
249. See Neuman, supra note 232, at 264 (explaining Kennedy’s functional approach).
250. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 263 (1990).
251. Id. at 274, 278.
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joined the majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, his departure from much
of the majority’s reasoning produced a narrower holding based solely on the
impracticality of a United States warrant executed in Mexico.252 The previously mentioned courts that applied the Boumediene factors to determine the
reach of the Fourth Amendment further betrays an argument that only Verdugo-Urquidez controls in the cross-border context.253
V. CROSS-BORDER SHOOTINGS CONSISTENT WITH FOURTH AMENDMENT
VIOLATIONS ARE COGNIZABLE UNDER BIVENS AFTER ABBASI
At the outset, while the Abbasi framework likely curtails the extension
of Bivens beyond contexts where the Court has recognized a Bivens action,
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion took pains to emphasize the vitality of
Bivens in the search and seizure context by stating:
[I]t must be understood that this opinion is not intended to cast doubt on
the continued force or even the necessity, of Bivens in the search and seizure context in which it arose. Bivens does vindicate the Constitution by
allowing some redress for injuries[,] and it provides instruction and
guidance to federal law enforcement officers going forward.254

Justice Kennedy further acknowledged Bivens as “a fixed principle in
the law” in the search and seizure context.255 Abbasi teaches that the extension of a Bivens remedy to a new context requires careful consideration of
separation of powers principles through the “special factors analysis.”256
This note concedes that a Bivens claim based on a cross-border shooting
presents a new context; thus, this section begins with the availability of other remedies and then focuses on the special factor analysis concluding that
the absence of special factors should result in the extension of a Bivens rem-

252. Bentley, Jr., supra note 212, at 339–40. Bentley argued that Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion was joined in full by only three Justices and thus resulted in a
plurality opinion. Id.
253. See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 729 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Sept. 7, 2018) (No. 18-309) (applying the Boumediene factors); Hernandez II, 785 F.3d
117 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), vacated sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017)
(per curiam); Hernandez III, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (applying the Boumediene factors to the
extraterritoriality of the Fifth Amendment); Hernandez I, 757 F.3d 249, 262 (5th Cir. 2014),
rev’d en banc, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct.
2003 (2017) (per curiam) (stating that “though Boumediene’s underlying facts concerned the
Suspension Clause, its reasoning was not so narrow” and noting that the Supreme Court’s
analysis invoked myriad constitutional rights from prior cases).
254. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856–57 (2017) (emphasis added).
255. Id. at 1857.
256. Id. at 1860.
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edy for victims of cross-border shootings that stem from Fourth Amendment
violations in the unreasonable seizure context.257
A.

For Noncitizens Killed at the Hands of Border Patrol Agents in Mexican Territory, It Is Bivens or Nothing

Chief Justice Marshall’s words in Marbury v. Madison (that for every
legal wrong, the law should provide a remedy) 258 explain the genesis for the
Bivens remedy and the prudence of the extension of Bivens in the crossborder context. Often, survivors of victims of tragic shootings are not financially compensated for their loss, but they can find some justice through the
criminal law. For Hernandez and Rodriguez, no such solace was to be
found. In the case of Agent Mesa, the executive branch refused Mexico’s
request for extradition and refused to indict Mesa in the United States as
well.259 For the Rodriguez family, they experienced the pain of two trials
where Agent Swartz was acquitted first of murder and later of manslaughter.260 With the doors to justice closed on the criminal front, the only recourse left to these survivors and likely survivors moving forward rests on
the availability of Bivens.
The sovereign immunity enjoyed by the United States bars claims
against the United States not excepted by the FTCA.261 The FTCA allows
claims to be brought against agents of the United States for common law
torts but excepts both constitutional violations and claims arising from injuries sustained in a foreign country.262 Also, an amendment to the FTCA, the
Westfall Act, likely forecloses the possibility that a victim could bring suit
in a state court on the reasoning that this act “accords federal employees
absolute immunity from common-law tort claims arising out of acts they
undertake in the course of their official duties.”263 As such, a Bivens claim
provides the only redress for noncitizen victims of cross-border shootings.264

257. See id. at 1855 (explaining that the Court has extended Bivens remedies in Bivens,
Carlson, and Davis).
258. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
259. Hernandez IV, 885 F.3d 811, 820 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, (U.S. May 28, 2019)
(No. 17-1678).
260. Julia Jacobs, Border Patrol Agent Who Shot Mexican Teenager Acquitted of Involuntary Manslaughter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/
border-patrol-acquitted-involuntary-manslaughter.html.
261. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 739 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.
Sept. 7, 2018) (No. 18-309).
262. Id. at 739–40.
263. Id. at 741.
264. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017) (explaining that alternative remedies can constitute a basis to deny the extension of Bivens to a given context).
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B.

No Special Factors Counsel Hesitation in a Cross-Border Context

The special factors analysis represents the Supreme Court’s deference
to separation of powers principles and asks whether the courts or Congress
should afford a remedy.265 The prominent consideration in the special factor
analysis “requires an assessment of [a damages remedy’s] impact on governmental operations systemwide.”266 This assessment gauges the burden
that such a remedy would have on federal employees and the impact that a
damages remedy would have on the government fisc.267
1.

The Burden on Federal Agents Does Not Provide a Basis for
Denying a Bivens Claim

The extension of a Bivens remedy to victims of cross-border shootings
will burden federal agents, but no more than the burdens placed on similarly
situated law-enforcement officials. The Fifth Circuit pointed to the transnational aspect of Border Patrol agents’ duties coupled with the agents’ need
to make “split-second decisions” as a basis for concluding that a Bivens
remedy would prove too onerous.268 As the dissent noted, however, there is
already a safeguard that protects federal agents in excessive force cases:
qualified immunity.269 Also, there is no indication of how split-second decisions made at the border are distinguishable from the same decisions that
must be made on a daily basis in every state in the union. Bivens remedies in
the border patrol context are not foreign concepts to border agents.270 Courts
have allowed Bivens actions for unreasonable searches conducted during
roving patrols and for unlawful arrests.271 CBP agents are tasked with the
knowledge of constitutional restraints on government conduct and thus, a
court denying a Bivens claim solely on the basis of where agents conduct
their duty is arbitrary at best, and was rightly rejected by the Ninth Circuit.272

265. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 757 (Smith, J., dissenting).
266. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858.
267. Id.
268. Hernandez IV, 885 F.3d 811, 819 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, (U.S. May 28, 2019)
(No. 17-1678).
269. Id. at 828 (Prado, J., dissenting).
270. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 746.
271. See Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2012) (allowing a
Bivens claim to proceed against a Border Patrol agent for a suspicionless search); MartinezAguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) (allowing a Bivens claim against a
Border Patrol agent for an unlawful arrest and the excessive use of force claims).
272. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 746.
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The Extension of a Bivens Claim to Border Patrol Agents Does
Not Affect Governmental Operations

The policy considerations surrounding the detention policy that served
as the basis for the constitutional violations alleged in Abbasi are missing in
the context of a cross-border shooting.273 There are no policy implications
that warrant hesitation in the extension of Bivens to Border Patrol agents in
this context. Indeed, an extension of Bivens comports with already existing
Border Patrol policy regarding the use of deadly force.274 This policy allows
the use of deadly force only if an agent has “reasonable grounds to believe
that such force is necessary to protect the [agent] or other persons from imminent danger of death or serious physical injury.”275 This standard mirrors
that found in the Supreme Court’s deadly force jurisprudence and implicates
no other policy considerations.276 Unlike Abbasi, where the plaintiffs questioned the decisions of high-level executive officials tasked with the implementation of policies in response to a terrorist attack, a Bivens claim against
Border Patrol agents serves the primary purpose of Bivens––the deterrence
of unconstitutional conduct by individual federal agents––without calling
into question high level determinations of executive officials.277
The Fifth Circuit’s emphasis on the impact that an extension of Bivens
would have on foreign affairs was misplaced.278 The court warned that an
extension of Bivens would “undermine Mexico’s respect for the validity of
the Executive’s prior determinations.”279 The court’s reasoning was specious. The extension of a civil remedy against an individual border patrol
agent for conduct on American soil does not undermine the executive’s
criminal law decisions. It serves only to redress constitutional harms perpetrated by United States agents. Also, if the court’s concern with Mexico’s
respect for the United States was genuine, then holding a federal agent accountable for constitutional violations against Mexican citizens serves that
interest far better than projecting an image that border patrol agents may act
with impunity when a Mexican national’s life is at stake.
Further, a Bivens extension would not implicate national security policy. True, the Border Patrol is tasked with “deterring and preventing the illegal entry of terrorists, terrorist weapons, persons, and contraband.”280 But
273. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017).
274. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(a)(2)(ii), (iii)(a) (2018).
275. Id.
276. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (announcing a rule in nearly identical
language as that subsequently used in the Border Patrol regulations).
277. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
278. Hernandez IV, 885 F.3d at 819–820.
279. Id. at 820.
280. Id. at 819.
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using these tasks as an argument that a Bivens action would encroach on
national security policy is inapt.281 There exists little distinction between an
instance where a Border Patrol agent uses deadly force against an individual
just inside the border and an instance where the individual is feet beyond the
border.282 To say that the latter implicates national security concerns while
the former does not represents just the talismanic incantation of national
security implications that Abbasi rejected.283 The Border Patrol is a domestic
law enforcement agency with highly trained agents informed on the Constitution’s imperatives. As such, a cross-border shooting falls outside of the
national security realm and is more akin to common law enforcement.
At bottom, the extension of Bivens for the use of deadly force to effectuate a seizure initiated by federal agents on United States soil and completed just beyond the border is a function within the competence of the judiciary and not an encroachment on the separation of powers. Such an extension
will not bring national policy decisions into play and indeed provides a
check for an extant deadly force policy in place for Border Patrol agents.
VI. CONCLUSION
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”284 It strains credulity to believe that actions taken from within the United States by those entrusted to enforce the law can end the life of a human
being with impunity if that human happens to be just on the other side of an
imperceptible line.

281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 828 (Prado, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 829.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).

2019]

BIVENS ON THE BORDER

201

The Supreme Court adopted the Bivens remedy to ensure that the
words of Chief Justice Marshall remained a vital component of American
law and not a platitude to be bandied about when it suits. Just as § 1983 suits
serve as a deterrence to state actors, so too does the availability of a Bivens
remedy act to deter federal agents. Abbasi retained the availability of Bivens
when confronted with an opportunity to overrule it. Even if the Court elevated the bar to Bivens, these cases, based on the pleadings, chinned that
bar. While Congress has shirked its responsibility to enshrine in the law a
right to redress for victims of the federal government’s abuse at the border,
the judiciary must stand ready to afford these victims remedies ensconced in
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
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